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ࡱ> 02/M nbjbj== ",WWnl FFFF R$  B D D D D D D $y bh h }  B B P B B v =`% :F0B B 0 B  B ." By defeating the argument that computers can be conscious Sriman Sadaputa Prabhu implicitly refutes the "solidity /liquidity of water" argument, Maharaja and here are the ideas restated in summary: 1. One of the ideas of Dr. John Searle is that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain just as the solidity/liquidity of water is an emergent property of the way the molecules behave. This argument is easily refutable, and it is refuted by Sriman Sadaputa Prabhu by using another of Dr. John Searle's ideas which is below (I do not remember reading material by Sriman Sadaputa Prabhu where he directly refutes the "solidity/liquidity of water" argument, but I have read material where he has repeatedly defeated the emergent property idea using Dr. John Searle's idea below) 2. Dr. John Searle has repeatedly argued against the field of artificial intelligence that there cannot be consciousness in machines because a system's behaving as if it had mental/conscious states is insufficient to establish that it does in fact have these states. Sriman Sadaputa Prabhu's simple point based on that idea is: If there is consciousness in such a system mimicking conscious behavior, where is the consciousness - is it in the constituent parts, is it in the combinations, is it in the system as a whole? Sriman Sadaputa Prabhu, in fact, has used Dr. Searle's ideas as a support for his presentations - that machines cannot be conscious. Sriman Sadaputa Prabhu repeatedly uses the same argument in his books, writings and presentations, with the same refrain - here we have the same logical structure as the brain (in computer software, hardware or the people passing slips of paper), but if there is consciousness, where is it? (e.g. in the "Simulated Worlds" video) There are other people who have made attempts to refute the argument of Dr. John Searle (the prominent among them is Dr. Larry Hauser) that simply symbol manipulation does not constitute consciousness and have hurled abuses at him. In the process Dr. Searle has accepted there were some flaws with details of his original argument (Chinese Room example), but has held on to his basic position. The main thrust of his thought experiment was to show that the syntactic manipulation of formal symbols does not by itself constitute a semantics. A consequence of this was that strong AI will fail because a system's behaving as if it had mental states is insufficient to establish that it does in fact have these states. Maharaja, Sriman Sadaputa Prabhu defeats the argument that machines can be conscious using Dr. John Searle's ideas as a support. Here is a transcript of Sriman Sadaputa Prabhu's presentation of Dr. John Searle's argument in the video "Mind and Brain", Maharaja (from 6:30 minutes to 11:00 minutes in the Mind and Brain video): "If we accept the reality of question, we can ask the question: Can a machine be conscious?" "The philosopher John Searle has thrown interesting light on this question by presenting the following argument:-" "Consider the computer that duplicates the brain activity of Mr. Jones. Suppose that it is conscious, just as Mr. Jones himself would be. The important thing about this computer is its logical structure which duplicates the logical structure of Mr. Jones' brain. The same logical structure can be embodied in a computer consisting of a large group of people seated at desks. In accordance with certain simple rules each person receives slips of paper from his neighbors, makes marks on them and passes them to other neighbors. By setting up the rules properly, this group of people can precisely duplicate all of the operations of the Jones computer. Just as the Jones computer duplicates Mr. Jones' brain, so this group of people collectively duplicates both the Jones computer and Mr. Jones' brain." "Does the group of people manifest the consciousness of Mr. Jones? Each individual in the group knows only his own activity of making marks on pieces of paper. We can even suppose that he does not even know the purpose of the group as a whole. Surely the consciousness of Mr. Jones is not present in any of the individuals in the group; but is it present in the group as a whole?" "It seems most reasonable to suppose that, in fact, the only consciousness in the group of people is in the individuals that make it up. But if this is so, then what can we say about the Jones computer? Shouldn't we conclude that it also lacks consciousness and it is simply producing behavior by a mechanical process?" "Finally, what about Mr. Jones' brain? What special features does it have that create the conscious experience of Mr. Jones? Its logical structure as a computer is the same as that of the Jones computer or the group of people. It only differs from them in the way its operations are carried out, by nerve impulses instead of by electrical currents in semiconductors or by the passing of written notes." "A nerve cell builds up an electrical potential between its inside and its outside. A nerve impulse involves a localized flow of ions across the cell membrane that neutalizes this electrical potential. While this flow takes place, it triggers a similar flow in adjacent parts of the membrane, while some electrical signal propagates down the length of the cell. From a computational point of view, the important thing is that some kind of signal is sent. The particular mechanism does not matter. The same thing can be said about the switching functions carried out by neural synapses." "The theory of the brain as a computer holds that only the logical arrangement of neural interconnections is important in determining human mental function. We have seen that this logical structure does not account for consciousness. Could it be that consciousness is a product of the particular physiochemical structure of neurons? Actually there is no more reason to associate consciousness with this cellular machinery than it is to associate it with the amplifier and photo-cell of the red-light machine." "As Huxley suggested consciousness seems to be a real feature of nature. It is not understandable in terms of physical structures and processes. It must be postulated as an extra irreducible element in physical systems. The example of electric charge shows that the idea of an irreducible element is not foreign to modern physics. It is reasonable, then, to introduce consciousness as an irreducible element in nature." 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